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The Hierarchy of Arms Control and
Disarmament Treaties
JAYANTHA DHANAPALA*
Throughout history men and nations have forged agreements in vari-
ous forms to regulate the conduct of war which, in the words of Clause-
witz, was regarded as "nothing but a continuation of political intercourse
with an admixture of other means."' In more recent times with the hor-
rors of warfare forcing men to realize that war should not be resorted to
in order to settle disputes, efforts were made to limit the possession of
armaments and actually disarm. Following wars, there have been armi-
stice arrangements or disarmament treaties imposed on the vanquished
by the victors. These form a distinct category in contrast to arms limita-
tion and disarmament treaties freely concluded in times of peace between
or among sovereign states in good faith and aimed at the prevention of
war. Together they represent a quest for security through arms control or
disarmament. For the purpose of this discussion, I propose to confine my-
self to treaties and agreements voluntarily reached by sovereign nations
after World War II for the purpose of arresting and reversing the arms
race both nuclear and non-nuclear.
While international agreements restricting the possession of arms are
themselves a means of achieving security, it is clear that they cannot be
viewed in isolation. For example, compliance with treaty obligations and
the durability of treaties are important aspects to be considered. The re-
cent emphasis on verification of treaties, and the convergence of views
that we are witnessing on challenge and on-site inspections illustrate this.
The present trend is towards detailed provisions for verification to be em-
bodied in treaties.
We have also seen how some treaties can be jeopardized by techno-
logical advancement such as when the 1972 bilateral US-USSR Treaty on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic'Missile Systems2 appeared to be under
threat as a result of moves to construct ballistic missile defense systems
based on "other physical principles" and futuristic weapons.3 In addition,
signed treaties are of tenuous or no value unless they are ratified. This
was the fate of the 1979 US-USSR Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms' or SALT II, which was not ratified although both parties
* Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva.
1. K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 596 (1943).
2. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
3. Id. arts. II, III.
4. Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol (did not enter into force), June
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stated initially that they would abide by its provisions as long as the
other party did. Had SALT II been in force it would have expired at the
end of 1985, and by May, 1986, the United States announced that it no
longer felt constrained by the SALT Ii limits.'
Finally, we must not ignore the importance of unilateral measures for
arms control and disarmament as well as confidence-building measures.
These are not substitutes for concrete arms limitations and disarmament
measures embodied in treaties, but they do provide a conducive atmo-
sphere for the conclusion and implementation of treaties.
Treaties are therefore landmarks in the tortuous and difficult path
towards achieving security at lower armament levels. They do not by
themselves transform- an international situation. However, they do re-
present the result of a coincidence of national interests and political will
on the part of sovereign nations to achieve arms control or arms reduc-
tions. International legal principles govern the operation of these treaties
and agreements. However, their efficacy and durability are finally deter-
mined by the international political climate. Article XV(2) of the ABM
Treaty,6 for example, provides for either party to withdraw from the
Treaty, with due notice, in the exercise of its national sovereignty leaving
it to the judgement of each party "that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter-
ests."7 Political relationships among states and the process of treaty nego-
tiations are also key aspects in the disarmament process. Thus, the act of
concluding treaties should be viewed in its broader context.
The theme I have set is a "hierarchy of treaties," implying a graded
system or a multi-tiered arrangement. The immediate question that arises
is what criteria one should adopt in establishing this hierarchy. Treaties
are international agreements concluded in written form between two or
more states and governed by international law.' We have multilateral
treaties at both global and regional levels, as well as bilateral treaties. Are
multilateral treaties involving more states more important than bilateral
treaties? Likewise, a treaty between the two major nuclear powers, U.S.
and USSR to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons is of indis-
putable global importance because of the awesome destructive capability
of nuclear weapons. Because of their global impact, the bilateral and mul-
tilateral processes of arms negotiations can no longer be strictly
18, 1979, United States-U.S.S.R., Senate Treaty Doc. No. 96-1, Executive Y, 96th. Cong. 1st.
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter SALT II].
5. President's Statement on Nuclear Test Bans, May 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54
(1986).
6. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, art. XV(2).
7. Id.
8. Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan.
27 1980), defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in writ-
ten form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."
VOL. 19:1
HIERARCHY OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES
segregated.
Another question that arises in establishing a hierarchy of treaties is
whether treaties which envisage the actual destruction or elimination of
weapons and the halt on their testing, development and production are
more important than treaties that set limits to the number of such weap-
ons nations might retain, prohibit the deployment of certain weapons in
specified zones or ban the use or first use of specific weapons. Are treaties
relating to nuclear weapons to be placed at a higher level in a hierarchy of
treaties than those dealing with chemical weapons or conventional
weapons?
This line of debate leads one inevitably into a cul-de-sac. I do not
believe we can establish a rigid order of precedence among treaties and
even if we did, according to some highly subjective and arbitrary criteria,
what benefit would it be in an analysis of the impact of treaties in the
achievement of the important goal of "general and complete disarmament
under effective international control?" 9 In 1925 when the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use In War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (commonly referred to as the
Geneva Protocol)1 0 was concluded, it was the result of the horrendous ex-
perience of the First World War in which the use of poison gas is re-
ported to have caused 1.3 million casualties. At the time, it did achieve its
objective. A draft convention providing for a total ban was discussed a
few years later but without success. With the passing years, the failure of
that Protocol to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling or de-
ployment of chemical or biological weapons and to provide for mecha-
nisms and procedures for violations of the Protocol has been exposed as
serious lacunae which the Conference on Disarmament is working to rec-
tify with a new convention. This is no reason to detract from the histori-
cal importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Similarly, the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972," a product of US-
USSR detente at the time, set limits on launchers for five years. Today,
seventeen years later, the fifty percent reduction in strategic arms that
the bilateral US-USSR negotiations aim at will result, inter alia, in a
limit of 1600 launchers. Again, one cannot assign an order or precedence
between these treaties. They have to be viewed in their historical context
and as part of a slow process of arresting and reversing the arms race.
9. Since the unanimous adoption of G.A. Res. 1378, U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item
70) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/4265 (1959), calling for general and complete disarmament under
effective international control, this has remained an agreed objective of the international
community.
10. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No.
8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
11. The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S.
No. 7504 (no longer in force) [hereinafter SALT I].
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Thus, the classification of treaties into different categories rather than
the establishment of a hierarchy appears to be a more useful mode of
analysis.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that among disarmament treaties those
that completely eliminate weapons have a greater impact in achieving
peace and security than treaties that seek to place limits on the posses-
sion of weapons. A prohibition of use of weapons while permitting their
development, manufacture and possession is still weaker as a constraint
on states.
In the post World War II context, the Charter of the United Na-
tions12 to which the 159 member states of the United Nations have a fun-
damental allegiance must remain sui generis of all multilateral agree-
ments on international security and disarmament. The prevention of war
and the maintenance of international peace and security are declared
objectives of the Charter. It also prohibits the use or threat of the use of
force in international relations, provides for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes, and establishes mechanisms for the U.N. to deal
with threats to peace and acts of aggression. The only specific reference
to disarmament is when the General Assembly is mandated to consider,
"principles governing disarmament and the reduction of armaments" and
the Security Council is made responsible for formulating plans for "a sys-
tem for the reduction of armaments" the objective being the establish-
ment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least
amount of diversion for armaments from the world's human and eco-
nomic resources."' 3 Nuclear disarmament is of course not mentioned in
the Charter which was signed before Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Notwithstanding this relatively perfunctory reference to disarma-
ment in its charter, the United Nations has from the adoption of its very
first resolution in January, 1946, addressed the subject of disarmament
and arms control continuously. 4 Institutions for the deliberation and ne-
gotiation of disarmament have been in existence and a number of multi-
lateral treaties have been concluded under the aegis of the United
Nations.
Goldblat 5 divides arms control agreements according to the obliga-
tions assumed by States. Thus, treaties are grouped into seven categories
which are:
1. Restrictions on nuclear weapon testing;
2. strategic arms limitation;
12. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
13. Id. art. IX.
14. Resolution Adopted in Reports of 1st Comm.: Establishment of a Commission to
Deal with the Problems Created by the Discovery of Atomic Energy, G.A. Res. 1, 1 U.N.
GAOR at 5, U.N. Doc. A/267 (1949).
15. J. GOLDBLAT, AGREEMENTS FOR ARMS CONTROL 596 (1982).
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3. non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
4. prohibition of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
5. demilitarization, denuclearization and other measures of restraint
in certain environments of geographic areas;
6. prevention of war; and
7. humanitarian laws of war.
As stated earlier, it is also possible to classify agreements into global,
regional and bilateral treaties. A broader and more helpful distinction
however would be to divide agreements into nuclear and non-nuclear cat-
egories. This acknowledges the indisputable fact that the prospect of nu-
clear war which has confronted mankind since Hiroshima and Nagasaki is
qualitatively different from the prospect of conventional war. It is true
that since World War II conventional wars have accounted for some 20
million deaths and must be prevented by conventional disarmament and
the peaceful settlement of disputes. The destructive capacity of nuclear
weapons, however, is unprecedentedly imperiling for the first time in
human history, the planet we live on, all human life on it and its support
systems. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General
Assembly"6 (the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament) states
this very clearly at paragraphs 19 and 20:
19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under effective interna-
tional control .... Progress towards this objective requires the conclu-
sion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms
race and on genuine measures of disarmament, taking into account
the need of States to protect their security.
20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority .... "
The Final Document also calls for measures and agreements to
achieve the prohibition or control of other weapons of mass destruction
such as chemical weapons and the balanced reduction of conventional
armaments and armed forces. 8 Provision is also made for partial and
comprehensive measures. 19
The language of the Final Document makes a distinction between
measures and agreements at paragraph 19 and 21.20 The implication is
clear. Agreements are by themselves not effective in achieving disarma-
ment. The implementation of disarmament agreements however repre-
16. U.N. GAOR, Tenth Special Session (Agenda Item 10), U.N. Doc. A/S-10-23 (1978)
[hereinafter SSOD I].
17. Id. at 11 19-20.
18. See Id.
19. Id. at 1 24-26.
20. Id. at 19, 21.
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sents an effective or genuine measure. The Programme of Action adopted
at the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament" prescribes a range
of issues on which multilateral agreement is necessary.
To consider the Treaties and agreements themselves, there is no
doubt that the INF Treaty22 between the U.S. and USSR, entered into
force on 1 June 1988, is the first genuine nuclear weapons disarmament
agreement. It eliminates all of the ground-launched intermediate range
(1000-5500 kin) and shorter-range (500-1000 km) missiles and launchers
of both parties and all of the support equipment. The verification provi-
sions of the Treaty have been described as being unprecedented, combin-
ing systematic on-site inspection, challenge inspection and national tech-
nical means of verification. A detailed analysis of the Treaty is not
relevant to this discussion. Its significance is obvious despite the fact that
the number of weapons eliminated comprise only three to four percent (3-
4%) of the total nuclear arsenal in the world.
Linked to the current improvement in the relationship between the
U.S. and the USSR are the bilateral talks going on regarding the ratifica-
tion of the 1974 bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),5 and the
1976 US-USSR Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).21 The for-
mer prohibits underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield in excess
of 150 kilotons which many commentators dismiss as far too high to act
as a curb on the development of nuclear weapons. The latter regulates
explosions conducted outside nuclear weapon test sites.
The most important treaty in this category of restricting nuclear
weapon tests is the 1963 multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)21
prohibiting any nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space or
under water. The failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty to
include underground testing has been regarded as a major lacuna. Follow-
ing the initiative of a group of non-aligned countries, an amendment con-
ference has been called for so that the PTBT can be converted into a
CTBT.2 6 The depository states are required to convene such a conference
but the proposal is unlikely to achieve the necessary consensus among the
three nuclear-weapon states for it to be adopted.
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
21. U.N. GAOR, Tenth Special Session (Agenda Item 11), U.N. Doc. A/S-10/23 (1978).
22. Treaty on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, United States-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY Doc. No. 11, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
23. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, July 3, 1974, United States-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 906 (1974) (unratified) [hereinafter TTBT].
24. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, May 28, 1976, United States-U.S.S.R., re-
printed in 15 I.L.M. 891 (1976)[hereinafter PNET].
25. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Underwater, Aug. 5, 1963, United States, U.K. and U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter PTBT].
26. Id. art. III, 1.
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(NPT)27 has become the most important part of the nuclear non-prolifer-
ation regime today. It embodies a carefully structured arrangement of re-
ciprocal obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon
states. The Treaty aims at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear weapon states, commits the parties to the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and facilitates the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Despite the refusal of some important countries to
join the NPT there has been a steady growth in the number of countries
joining the NPT regime. The Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty is
scheduled for 1990 but more important will be the result of the 1995 Con-
ference which will have to decide on the period of extension of this
Treaty.
In the category of treaties dealing with nuclear weapons there is the
1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 8 under which parties to the Treaty are
prohibited from placing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
and facilities for such weapons on or under the sea-bed outside a 12-mile
limit from the coast line. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty" demilitarized the
Antarctic region which became the first nuclear weapon-free zone to be
created by treaty. This aspect of the Treaty is widely acclaimed by its
exclusivity, the fact that signatories have full rights in contrast to those
acceding to the Treaty, the presence of South Africa as a party, and more
recently the agreement for the exploitation of mineral resources in Ant-
arctica has been the subject of controversy. The 1967 Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) °
also created a nuclear weapon free zone for the first time in an inhabited
part of the world by prohibiting the testing, use, manufacture, production
or acquisition by any means, and the receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment or any form of possession of any nuclear weapons in Latin America.
More recently the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty or the
Treaty of Rarotonga"1 established a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific
where parties are forbidden to manufacture or acquire by other means
any nuclear explosive device, as well as to possess or control any such a
device inside or outside the zone. Nuclear testing and the dumping of
radioactive waste is also prohibited. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty 2 bans
27. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
28. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
29. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1979, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 4780.
30. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 3265.
31. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1442
(1985).
32. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
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the placing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in Earth's
orbit and on celestial bodies or the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer
space. The establishment of military bases and testing of weapons on ce-
lestial bodies is also banned. The 1979 Moon Treaty3 declares that the
Moon shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and bans the use of
the Moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes. As of 1987, this
treaty had only eleven parties.3 '
Among the bilateral treaties the 1972 ABM Treaty, the SALT I
Agreement, the TTBT, PNET and SALT II have been mentioned.
In the non-nuclear category, the 1925 Geneva Protocol has been men-
tioned. In 1972 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction" was concluded eliminating all forms
of biological weapons and toxins. The Convention contains a commitment
of the parties to negotiate for a similar ban on chemical weapons. These
negotiations are going on in the Conference on Disarmament, the Geneva
based 40-nation negotiating forum. In 1977, a Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifica-
tions Techniques (ENMOD Convention)36 was concluded multilaterally
to ban the manipulation of nature to cause such phenomena as earth-
quakes, tidal waves, flooding, etc.
The 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects37 has three protocols restrict-
ing the use of land mines, booby traps, incendiary weapons and fragmen-
tation weapons. This Convention was the initiative of the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
A distinct category of treaties encompass confidence-building mea-
sures which are not themselves disarmament or arms control measures.
Nevertheless, they are relevant to our discussion since they are aimed at
the prevention of nuclear war and have been concluded between the U.S.
and the USSR. These bilateral treaties include the 1963 Memorandum of
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. IV, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
33. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
34. Moon Treaty signatories as of 1987: Austria, Chile, France, Guatemala, India, Mo-
rocco, The Netherlands, Peru, The Philippines, Romania and Uruaguay.
35. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, April 4, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
36. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of En-
viromnental Modifiction Techniques (ENMOD), May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No.
9614.
37. Convention of Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980).
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Understanding"8 which established the famous Moscow-Washington "hot-
line;" the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Improve the US-USSR Direct
Communication Link"9 which modified the 1963 agreement; the 1971
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War;40 the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over
the High Seas;41 the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War;
42
the 1987 Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction
Centres;43 the Agreement on Notification of Launches of International
Balligtic Missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles44 and the
June 1989 Agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on the Prevention
of Dangerous Military Activities. 45 Some of these agreements such as the
Agreement to Avoid Nuclear Accidents have also been concluded bilater-
ally between the USSR and France and USSR and the UK.
The most important multilateral agreement on confidence building
measures is the Helsinki Document on the Confidence-Building Measures
and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament in Europe (1975).' It
is part of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and envisages the notification of major military ma-
neuvers in Europe. 47 As a follow-up to the Helsinki Accords the Stock-
holm Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures of 198648 was con-
cluded to prevent surprise attack or accidental war in Europe. The
verification arrangements of the agreement were innovative. The Agree-
ment covers important troop movements, military exercises and similar
activities within designated limits.
Despite the number of treaties and agreements described above, the
arms race both nuclear and non-nuclear continues and threatens to enter
outer space as well. The idea of having a comprehensive treaty for general
38. Memo of Understanding Establishing the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications
Link, United States-U.S.S.R., signed June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362.
39. Agreement on Measures to Improve the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications
Link, United States-U.S.S.R., signed Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7187.
40. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, United
States-U.S.S.R., signed Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186.
41. Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas, United
States-U.S.S.R., signed May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379.
42. Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, United States-U.S.S.R., signed June
22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S. No. 7654.
43. Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, United
States-U.S.S.R., signed Sept. 15, 1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 76 (1988).
44. Agreement on the Notification of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile Launches, United States-U.S.S.R., signed May 31, 1988, re-
printed in 27 I.L.M. 1200 (1988).
45. Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989, re-
printed in 28 I.L.M. 877 (1989).
46. See Conference on Sbcurity and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 73
DEP'T. ST. BULL. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
47. Id.
48. Conference on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe: Final Stockholm Document, Sept. 19, 1986, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 190 (1987).
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and complete disarmament has been the subject of discussions in the
past. In 1961, the U.S. and USSR issued a "Joint Statement of Agreed
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations""9 known as the McCloy-Zorin
Agreement. This agreement was unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly. Negotiations to implement the principles broke down in
later years but some of these principles have been embodied in the Final
Document of SSOD I." More recently, bilateral US-USSR statements
have contained important statements of principle such as the statement
that a "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.""1 Impor-
tant as these agreed statements are, until they are formally embodied in
treaties which impose legal obligations on states they will only remain
declaratory and not mandatory.
In the category of multilateral treaties it is also important to note the
status of implementation of the agreements and the number of parties to
them. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as of 1 January 1989, had
139 parties and ranks as the multilateral disarmament treaty with the
largest number of adherents.52 The PTBT with 118 parties, the 1925 Ge-
neva Protocol with 115, the BW Convention with 111, and the Outer
Space Treaty with 91 parties are other agreements with a large number of
adherents.
Looking to the future in the present context of improving US-USSR
relations, it is reasonable to expect further agreements in disarmament
and arms control. A fifty percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons
has been agreed upon in principle and negotiations are proceeding. In Vi-
enna, the CFE talks hold promise of an agreement reducing conventional
weapons in Europe. In the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on
achieving a chemical weapons ban are being pursued energetically al-
though problems remain. The body of treaties must be steadily expanded
to achieve disarmament while ensuring that existing agreements are
implemented.
49. Report of the United States and the Soviet Union to the 16th General Assembiy
on the Results of Their Bilateral Talks, U.N. Doc. A/4879 (Sept. 20 1961), in U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 1961 DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 439-431.
50. SSOD 1, supra note 16.
51. United States-Soviet Summit in Geneva, Joint Statement of Nov. 21, 1985, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nov. 25, 1985, at 1422.
52. NPT, supra note 27.
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